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Plutonium Fuel (MOX)
Budgetary Concerns

ANA's Nuclear Reality Check$ report on the Department of Energy budget

Environmental Concerns

The strontium-90 plume of reprocessing waste at Hanford, WA
ANA's 2011 Environmental issues
fact sheet.


 


Mixed Oxide Plutonium Fuel (MOX)
Mixed Oxide Plutonium Fuel (MOX) is composed of uranium dioxide and plutonium dioxide powders which are mixed inside of fuel pellets.  Because plutonium releases more radioactivity than uranium, this mixed fuel is more difficult to control inside of reactors and requires more safeguards than traditional uranium reactor fuel. In 2008 MOX fuel rods being tested by Duke Energy started warping and Duke withdrew from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s testing agreement.

The additional risks posed by MOX plutonium fuel, along with renewed global skepticism about nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, have resulted in the world-wide decline of the MOX industry. Japan has cancelled all of its orders for MOX plutonium fuel and the UK has recently closed its MOX plant in Sellafield due to a lack of customers. With no willing customers, the Department of Energy is pressuring the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to use MOX plutonium fuel. Some of the reactors that TVA is considering for MOX have the same Mark I exploding design that failed in Fukushima.

The US MOX program results from the 1998 Agreement on the Management and Disposition of Plutonium with Russia. This agreement designates 54 metric tons of surplus weapons grade plutonium for “immobilization” through irradiation as MOX fuel. Most of this plutonium comes from dismantled warheads. Although MOX is funded as a nonproliferation program, it actually increases proliferation risks in two ways:
  • By transporting dangerous plutonium oxide powder from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico where the US is currently processing its weapons plutonium to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina where MOX fuel assemblies will be manufactured.
  • Encouraging commercial markets for plutonium as reactor fuel.

Today, the Russians have changed their minds about what they will do with their MOX fuel and plan to use it in “breeder reactors” which actually generate more plutonium – hardly a nonproliferation advance. Adding salt to this wounded program is its cost; ballooning from an original estimate of $1.6 billion to $9.7 billion today.


Reprocessing Spent Nuclear Fuel / Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
What is Reprocessing?

Reprocessing refers to the chemical separation of fissionable uranium and plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. The World War II-era Manhattan Project developed reprocessing technology in the effort to build the first atomic bomb. With the development of commercial nuclear power after the war, reprocessing was considered necessary because of a perceived scarcity of uranium. Breeder reactor technology, which transmutes non-fissionable uranium into fissionable plutonium and thus produces more fuel than consumed, was envisioned as a promising solution to extending the nuclear fuel supply. Commercial reprocessing attempts, however, encountered technical, economic, and regulatory problems. In response to concern that reprocessing contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, President Carter terminated federal support for commercial reprocessing. Reprocessing for defense purposes continued, however, until the Soviet Union’s collapse brought an end to the Cold War and the production of nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy’s latest initiative to promote new reactor technology using “proliferation-resistant” reprocessed fuel raises significant funding and policy issues for Congress.

Source: "Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2008.

What is wrong with GNEP? (Click on each to learn more)

-Reprocessing is exorbitantly costly

-Reprocessing generates toxic waste and does nothing to solve the problem of nuclear waste


-Reprocessing undermines nuclear nonproliferation efforts


What can you Do?

In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Department of Energy (DOE) has drafted a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and is in the middle of a comment period in which you can tell DOE what you think about their plan. You do not have to be an expert. You just need to care about the future of your community and country. Check back on this page to see information on upcoming hearings in or near your community.


Federal report finds laboratory accident that exposed employees to radiation was preventable
published Monday, January 23, 2012  286 Views :: 0 Comments

January 19, 2012


By The Associated Press


IDAHO FALLS, Idaho — An accident at the Idaho National Laboratory that exposed 16 employees to plutonium radiation could have been prevented, according to a new report from the U.S. Department of Energy.


Inadequate safety measures and ineffective training contributed to the November contamination and lab officials missed several opportunities to make changes, states a report released Wednesday by the Energy Department’s Office of Health, Safety and Security.


The accident happened in a building that once housed a nuclear reactor. Workers had been taking plutonium fuel out of storage when they came upon radioactive materials held in two containers, each marked with a label stating they were damaged. After talking to supervisors, workers removed the wrapping on one of the containers and a radioactive black powder spilled out.


The workers had on lab coats and a few had gloves, but none had respiratory gear or other protective clothing, according to the 123-page report.


It’s too early to tell how much radiation the workers were exposed to, said Sharon Dossett, the lab’s director of environment, safety and health. She said she expects to find that the doses were so low that they won’t cause health problems.


However, at least one worker is believed to have inhaled the plutonium contamination. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency says on its website that internal exposure to plutonium poses an “extremely serious health hazard” because it stays in the body for decades and increases the risk of cancer.


Officials suspect the container had been damaged years ago, and that long-term exposure to oxygen and moisture caused some of the plutonium to deteriorate into powder.


The investigation found that a series of problems led to the accident and that lab managers were aware of some of the dangers.


At least seven years ago information was lost that would have detailed the condition of the fuel plates containing plutonium-239, according to the report.


Also, lab officials — including Phil Breidenbach, the director of nuclear operations — received recommendations for safe handling of the fuel plates in January of 2009 and June 2011. But the guidelines were not followed on either occasion, investigators found.

Deputy laboratory director Riley Chase told the Post Register the lab is looking into Breidenbach’s apparent failure to act on the recommendations.


The report also provides details of the accident that raise safety questions.

On Nov. 8, the report states, workers removed four small boxes containing plutonium fuel plates from a vault. Two were labeled with warnings about radioactive contents and abnormalities in their conditions.


About 10 minutes later, a shift supervisor called a manager to discuss the labels, according to the report, and the two worked out a plan to open them. Shortly after, the workers — none wearing protective clothing except for a few with gloves — placed the containers on a “confinement hood” and a worker started to open one of them.


One worker, not named in the report, told Energy Department investigators claims to have asked supervisors what to do in the event of a fire or if a powder was found. The worker said the supervisor responded that it was “not a valid question.”


The supervisor does not remember such a conversation, investigators said.


Minutes later, according to the report, black powder spilled out of one of the containers as a worker cut through the plastic covering. The workers conducted tests to see what they had found, remaining in the room for more than four minutes until a radiation alarm sounded.


Chase, the deputy lab director, said management underestimated the hazard posed by the plutonium fuel plates, which were at least 30 years old, and that if they had predicted the accident they would have used a “glove box,” which provides much more protection than a standard confinement hood.


The investigators recommended that the company that holds the lab management contract, Battelle Energy Alliance, should reinforce proper work procedures and improve self-assessments at the complex.


The Energy Department also said in the report that local DOE officials knew about the safety problems at the site, accepted that risk and didn’t put interim controls in place to help prevent any accidents.



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MOX Facts
  • The MOX program's $12 billion+ cost puts real nonproliferation programs at risk.
  • There are no US customers for MOX plutonium fuel - it's a project with no purpose.
  • Russia isn't holding up its end of the bargain, their program will create more plutonium.

ANA's March 2012 comments to the Department of Energy regarding their plans to dispose of plutonium via the MOX program.

Ploughshares Fund fact sheet on cutting MOX out of the budget.

Issue brief on MOX from Friends of the Earth.

Letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding MOX fuel testing

Institute for Energy & Environmental Research's Science for Democratic Action issue on MOX

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article on MOX vs. other plutonium disposal methods.

Freedom of Information Act Documents
Response from the National Nuclear Security Administration regarding ANA's FOIA request for the Feb. 15, 2012 Congressionally mandated report on the MOX program.

Impact Study on the use of MOX fuel at Browns Ferry and Sequoyah nuclear power plants

Summary of 2009 TVA meeting: discussing MOX in Tennessee Valley Authority (AL) and Energy Northwest (WA) reactors.

MOX FOIA dump #1:
  • Report No. EN-MOX-002, Oct. 2009
  • MOX Loading Procedures in Europe, Energy Northwest Comments
  • Major Steps during FUel Receipt
  • Energy Northwest MOX Summary, Aug. 2009
  • MOX Fuel Board Presentation, Jun. 2009
  • Report No. EN-MOX-001, May 2009
  • MOX Fuel Long term & Near Term Focus Presentation, May 2009
  • MOX Status Presentation, April 2009
  • Memorandum of Understanding between the Tennessee Valley Authority and Energy Northwest for Advanced Fuel Cycle Demonstration, Mar. 2009

MOX FOIA dump #2:
  • Energy Northwest Request for Public Records Form including delegation letter from JL Lewis to S Gambhir (2pgs)
  • Energy Northwest Public Records Request Act Privilege Log Request Control Number (8pgs)
  • 31 emails dating from April 2009-January 2010 (86pgs)
  • "Request for Proposal in Support of Paragon Fuels Response to DOE RFP DE-RP02-98CH10888 for Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication and Reactor Irradiation Services" letter from JW Baker to Kathleen A. Wehlan. (29pgs)
  • "Questions for BPA" (4pgs)
  • "The Use of MOX Fuel" (3pgs)
  • MOX Fuel OVerview Presentation (7pgs)
  • Draft Results from FY11-20 Strategic Planning Session (8pgs)

Reprocessing Resources
Blue Ribbon Commission final report, including recommendations on reprocessing.

ANA comments from the New Mexico scoping hearing for a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement regarding surplus plutonium disposition.

ANA comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding proposed rulemaking on reprocessing


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