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| | | published Friday, September 19, 2008 | 314 Views :: 0 Comments | |  |
April 30, 2008 Via email to: complextransformation@nnsa.doe.gov
Theodore Wyka
Complex Transformation SPEIS Document Manager
Office of Transformation, NA-10.1
U.S. Department of Energy/NNSA
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, DC 20585 RE: Draft Complex Transformation SPEIS Comments
Dear Mr. Wyka:
Southwest Research and Information Center (SRIC), a 37-year old nonprofit organization involved with health, energy, and environmental issues, submits the following comments on Draft Complex Transformation SPEIS, hereinafter the Draft SPEIS or “Bombplex.” The comments should be considered in addition to those oral comments made on behalf of SRIC by Don Hancock at the March 11, 2008, hearing in Albuquerque. As you know, DOE must fully consider and respond to all comments.
The Draft SPEIS is legally flawed and DOE cannot now proceed to issue a legally and technically adequate Final SPEIS.
1. The Draft SPEIS does not rigorously evaluate all reasonable alternatives.
The twin functions of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are to “require that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences, and provide for broad dissemination of relevant environmental information.” See Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 US 332, 350 (1989). Adequate time for significant public participation and complete response to public comment also is required. SRIC believes that the comment period on the Draft SPEIS should have been extended for 90 days because of its importance and complexity.
The discussion of alternatives is the legally required heart of any EIS. 40 CFR § 1502.14. The legally adequate EIS must “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” 40 CFR § 1502.14(a).
Nonetheless, the Draft SPEIS leaves out the alternative that more than 95% of the scoping commentors supported – a No Production Alternative. The Draft SPEIS states: it “does not analyze alternatives to the United States’ national security policy. Rather, it examines the environmental effects of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives for execution of the program based on the existing policy and foreseeable changes in this policy.” at 2-1.
That explanation is political and does not provide an adequate legal basis to exclude the No Production Alternative. Such an alternative would analyze the nuclear weapons complex that would produce no nuclear weapons, would conduct no nuclear weapons testing in Nevada, would safely store and dispose of radioactive and hazardous wastes from past nuclear weapons production, and would decontaminate and decommission nuclear weapons facilities that are no longer needed, among other things. There should be a detailed discussion of that alternative and its environmental impacts in a revised Draft SPEIS that is issued for public comment.
Even though the political decision about what to include in the SPEIS excluded the alternative of complying with the U.S. Constitution and Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which the U.S. ratified in 1969, it is possible that future presidents and congresses will want to do so. Unfortunately, the SPEIS does not provide the basis to do that, obviously trying to restrict the information that would be needed and the legal basis for such action. While that political decision may meet the policies of the current administration, it does not comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Another reasonable alternative has been discussed in appropriations bills and congressional committees controlled by Republicans: substantial consolidation and elimination of nuclear weapons facilities. But the Draft SPEIS also does not consider that consolidation alternative, or even the more limited consolidation for the three weapons laboratories. The Draft SPEIS dismisses consolidation of the three weapons laboratories based on 1995 decisions. at 3-127. Of course, the world has changed since 1995 and updated analysis is required about whether consolidation is a reasonable alternative. The Draft SPEIS has not conducted such an analysis, which must be done in a revised Draft SPEIS that is reissued for public comment. Furthermore, people in New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Nevada, California, and Missouri are not apprised of what the impacts of closing or substantially reducing the nuclear weapons missions would be. There is no discussion of whether the weapons facilities and personnel could change their mission to renewable energy, environmental cleanup, nonproliferation, and other necessary programs and what the impacts would be, as is required by NEPA.
Of course, the Draft SPEIS does not discuss the environmental impacts of the No Production or the Substantial Consolidation alternatives. The alternatives and their environmental impacts must be included in a revised and reissued Draft SPEIS for public comment, because the Draft “is so inadequate as to preclude meaningful analysis.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(a).
2. The Draft SPEIS does not adequately analyze the environmental impacts of the alternatives that are discussed.
The legally required “hard look” at environmental impacts must include the consequences of using the nuclear weapons under the alternatives presented. The analysis should include the impacts of using some or all of the warheads against one or more nations or non-national groups. The impacts considered should be on the locations where the nuclear weapons would be used, as well as on the United States. There is no such analysis in the Draft SPEIS, even though SRIC specifically stated in its scoping comments that such an analysis is required.
The Draft SPEIS does not adequately analyze the impacts of the proposed future weapons complex. The assertions in the Draft SPEIS that the “Reliable Replacement Warhead” (RRW) program would create less environmental impacts is not proven. at 2-21. Any nuclear weapons complex, with or without RRW, will create radioactive and hazardous waste, and the Draft SPEIS does not adequately analyze the environmental impacts of those wastes for the alternatives discussed.
For example, the environmental impacts of the transuranic (TRU) waste produced by the Bombplex should be analyzed based on the presumption that the waste will be stored and disposed forever at the generator site. The Draft SPEIS does not do that. Instead, it assumes: any TRU waste from a CPC is “disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).” at 3-22. Contradictorily, the Draft SPEIS also assumes “for the purposes of transportation analysis only” that WIPP is the disposal location. at 10-24. There are multiple inadequacies with such an analysis. It does not analyze the most likely reasonable alternative – that the generator site would be the storage and disposal location. It does not adequately analyze the impacts on WIPP of having more waste for a longer period of time (the 10-year old analysis in the WIPP SEIS-II is out of date and inadequate). The transportation analysis is not conservative because if there is off-site storage and disposal at a location other than WIPP, the shipping distances could be longer, the number and types of accidents higher, the transportation modes (adding rail transport) and routes would be different than for WIPP. Thus, the Draft SPEIS analysis is not bounding.
Further, since the CPC is presumed to operate from 2022 to around 2072 (at 3-21), the huge majority of the TRU waste would be generated after WIPP closes in about 2030. Thus, the alternatives are to leave the waste at the generator site CPC or to have a new disposal facility, not to assume that the waste would go to WIPP. A Draft SPEIS should discuss and analyze each of those three alternatives.
In addition, TRU waste generation amounts in the Draft SPEIS do not make sense and are not credible. Table 3.4.1-6 on page 3-30 says that LANL producing 20 pits a year or 50 pits a year generates the same amount of TRU, which is not credible. The source for the table is “NNSA 2007,” which is the Data Call. That document is 609 pages, but from SRIC’s search, it does not have the TRU waste information shown on Draft SPEIS Table 3.4.1-6. The Data Call does have Table 3.4.1-4 “CPC Waste Volumes,” which shows increasing amounts of TRU being generated from 125 to 200 pits per year of 590 cubic meters to 730 cubic meters (770 cubic yards to 955 cubic yards). In contrast, the Draft SPEIS Table 3.4.1-4 and Table 3.16-1 show that the CPC 200 pits per year surge generates 850 cubic yards annually (rather than the 955 cubic yards shown in the Data Call). The Data Call also has Table 5-39, which is the No Action/Routine Operations Alternative which shows annual LANL generation of 570 cubic yards of TRU waste. Note b of that table indicates that the values are based on 20 pits produced per year. Table 5-47, the Expanded Operations Alternative, shows that 860 cubic yards of TRU waste would be generated annually. Note i on that table states that assumes “pit production of up to 80 pits per year.” In contrast, Table 3.4.1-10 of the Draft SPEIS states that the LANL 50/80 Alternative would generate 575 cubic yards of TRU solid waste annually, including 75 cubic yards per year for 10 years from PF-4. SRIC does not believe any of the TRU waste volumes are credible. Table 3.4.1-7 of the Draft SPEIS shows that the “Los Alamos Upgrade” would generate 200 cubic yards of TRU waste (presumably during the entire construction, rather than annually). Since DOE does not use the volumes consistently, it is implicitly agreeing that it does not have credible estimates. Once again, since DOE does not have credible volume estimates, it cannot make a credible, bounding analysis of environmental impacts. DOE must develop credible TRU waste estimates and analysis of environmental impacts and then issue a revised Draft EIS for public comment, because the Draft “is so inadequate as to preclude meaningful analysis.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(a).
The Draft SPEIS also does not analyze the costs of maintaining a large nuclear weapons “Bombplex” for the next century. Such an analysis is required to meet one of the purpose and need statements that the SPEIS is to address – the “cost-effective” nuclear weapons complex. One of the reference documents to the Draft SPEIS, a December 2007, “Independent Business Case Analysis of Consolidation Options for the Defense Programs SNM and Weapons Production Missions” concludes that “NNSA spends $1.8 billion (including $200 million for SNM transportation) annually on SNM operations, of which about $300 million is devoted to new construction or renovation.” at iii. “At least an anticipated $100 million per year will be required for routine maintenance; thus, at a constant budget level, only $200 million annually would be available for construction of new facilities. Clearly, this is insufficient for implementation of any of these consolidation options on the schedules proposed in the SPEIS.” at ix. In summary, “[t]he cash flow figures demonstrate that significant increases from baseline funding will be required to modernize and consolidate the SNM production complex.” at xi.
So another inadequacy of the Draft SPEIS is that it does not even inform the public and policymakers that the “preferred alternative” cannot be funded by the current weapons budget, which is equivalent to the Cold War peak spending. That information must be discussed along with description and analysis of alternatives that would cost less to construct and operate.
Furthermore, the Draft SPEIS does not adequately discuss the total amounts of radioactive and hazardous waste that would be generated by the Bombplex nor the costs of storage and disposal of those wastes. Neither the Draft SPEIS nor any other document has discussed the alternatives for storage and disposal of those waste, nor the environmental impacts of storage, transportation, and disposal. No decisions can be made about the Bombplex without such a NEPA analysis. Once again, the Draft SPEIS must be revised and reissued for public comment because the Draft “is so inadequate as to preclude meaningful analysis.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(a).
The discussion in the Draft SPEIS on pages 5-404 to 5-409 is entitled “Impacts of Transferring Category I/II SNM from Pantex Zone 4 to Zone 12.” However, the discussion does not provide an adequate basis for any decisions about moving of the “60 metric tons” of plutonium pits.
SRIC has doubts as to whether the figures in the Draft SPEIS regarding the DOE-owned and controlled property are correct. DOE or other federal agencies on its behalf have been trying to purchase land surrounding the Pantex site over the past few years, and apparently have acquired some additional surrounding land. The SPEIS must include information about the actual amount of DOE owned and controlled property as part of its baseline discussion about the site as well as in the analysis of the environmental impacts.
The Draft SPEIS does not provide the basis for moving any SNM from Zone 4 to Zone 12. Indeed, the transfer could lessen security. Zone 4 is farther removed from the Pantex boundary than is Zone 12. Placing plutonium pits in close proximity the weapons assembly and disassembly activities in Zone 12 would seem to increase risk, both to the pits and other operations within Zone 12, as compared with maintaining the current mile or more of separation. The Draft SPEIS must more fully discuss the security issues and analyze the environmental impacts of not moving the pits from Zone 4, increasing security of the pits in Zone 4, as well as moving them to Zone 12.
Another aspect that should be considered, and is missing from the Draft SPEIS, relates to the possibility of international inspections of the pits to provide transparency as to whether the U.S. provides access to international inspectors. Having pits stored in a location separated from weapons assembly and disassembly operations would appear to be better suited for international inspections. But there is also no analysis of that possibility in the Draft SPEIS.
SRIC has long advocated that plutonium pits be immobilized so that they could no longer be used for weapons without very substantial additional processing and that the immobilized plutonium be prepared for disposal. The Draft SPEIS does not consider that alternative or its environmental impacts.
Another reasonable alternative is to “deform” the pits in some way so that they would not be readily usable in warheads. There are various ways that pits could be modified so that they would not longer be able to be placed into warheads. The SPEIS must analyze such options as alternatives to moving the pits and as security alternatives for the pits. The Draft SPEIS does not consider that alternative or its environmental impacts. Thus, the SPEIS cannot be used as the basis for any decisions about whether or not to move plutonium pits from Zone 4 at Pantex.
The Draft SPEIS states that “NNSA does not currently see a need to resume nuclear testing to certify the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.” at 2-19. Given that presumption and the Draft SPEIS goal to reduce the footprint of NNSA, the Draft SPEIS should analyze the alternative of mothballing the Nevada Test Site (NTS) stockpile stewardship activities and the environmental impacts of that action. The waste management and environmental restoration activities at NTS must be maintained for decades to come.
The Bombplex would continue open-burn/open detonation areas at several sites. The Draft SPEIS must consider the alternative of eliminating all such areas because of the hazard to the public and the air pollution created. The public cannot do open burning of trash, and DOE should not be allowed to do open burning of hazardous, explosive, and radioactive materials.
The Bombplex would also continue waste “disposal” in unlined pits and trenches at various sites. Such sites can leak, so the practice should be abandoned. The Draft SPEIS should fully consider ending such practice and discuss the alternative storage and disposal methods at each site and it should fully discuss the environmental impacts of the existing practice and the alternatives.
3. The Bombplex must be described and analyzed in a stand alone Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, not as a supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM) PEIS.
SRIC raised this legal inadequacy in its scoping comments. On page D-15, the Draft SPEIS notes that this issue was raised in scoping comments and references Section 1.5, 1.6, 2.0, 2.1, 2.5, and Chapter 3 of the Draft SPEIS as its response. However, none of those cited sections actually provides an analysis of whether a new PEIS is needed.
The purpose and need for the SSM PEIS is on pages 2-7 to 2-10 of that document. A fundamental part of the purpose and need for the SSM PEIS was because “[t]he United States has stopped the development and production of new-design nuclear weapons.” at 2-7. The two new needs identified were to “[m]aintain the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons” and “a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.” Id.
In contrast, the Draft SPEIS specifically describes a Bombplex in which new-design nuclear weapons could be an important part – the RRW program. Such a requirement is not consistent with the SSM PEIS, so DOE has a new proposed action – new-design nuclear weapons – and it must have a new PEIS.
Further, the Draft SPEIS has a new third purpose, not included in the SSM PEIS: “Create a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure that is cost-effective, and has adequate capacity to meet reasonably foreseeable national security requirements; and consolidate Category I/II SNM at few sites and locations within sites to reduce the risk and safeguards costs.” at 2-1. That additional purpose could also be best considered in a new PEIS.
Thus, SRIC concludes that as a matter of law DOE must stop the SPEIS process and instead issue a new, stand-alone Bombplex Draft PEIS, if it intends to consider that new proposed action of new-design nuclear weapons.
As SRIC strongly opposes new-design nuclear weapons or new plutonium pit production capabilities, the preferred option is the revise and reissue for public comment a new Draft SPEIS which specifically precludes any new-design nuclear weapons and considers the reasonable alternatives and their environmental impacts.
4. The Draft SPEIS does not meet the minimum legal requirements for responding to public comments.
SRIC submitted both oral and written scoping comments on the Bombplex. While the Draft SPEIS acknowledges that 33,000 comments were received, it provides no index of the commentors, so SRIC and others cannot determine that its scoping comments were considered and responded to. Indeed, it is clear that some of SRIC’s scoping comments, such as those related to the required analysis of use of nuclear weapons, the need to analyze the impacts of storing and disposing of all wastes at the generator sites, and the need to provide full cost estimates, were not responded to, a clear violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and DOE NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021.311(e)). SRIC and any other commentor should be able to verify that their comments were considered, which the Draft SPEIS does not do. The listing of document numbers on pages D-12 to D-72 does not allow SRIC or other commentors to ascertain which numbers were assigned to their comments, since there is no master list of commentors by number provided. DOE must have a publicly available list of all commentors and how their comments were considered.
5. There are many factual and typographical errors in the Draft SPEIS
Perhaps the errors are another indication of the political decision made to rush to complete an SPEIS, no matter how legally and technically inadequate, during the Bush administration.
Some examples of the errors are the following.
Contrary to the statement (at 2-5), President Clinton did not “direct” the nuclear testing moratorium in 1992. It was President George H.W. Bush.
Pages 3-124 and 5-405 state that Table 3.7-2 shows the requirements for a new Zone 12 pit storage facility at Pantex. However, Table 3.7-2 actually relates to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), not Pantex. Table 3.7-3 relates to Pantex. However, as noted above, the analysis of alternatives and environmental impacts in the Draft SPEIS regarding pit storage is grossly inadequate and cannot serve as the basis for any decisions about pit storage.
Pages 5-308 and 5-313 provide very different amounts of legacy TRU waste inventory at the Savannah River Site (SRS) while citing the same source document. Page 5-308 states that the inventory is “of 43,167 cubic yards of legacy TRU waste (WSRC 2002a).” In contrast, Page 5-313 states that the inventory is “of 14,389 cubic yards of legacy TRU waste (WSRC 2002a).” Clearly, the two figures, one of which is three times higher than the other, cannot both be correct. SRIC believes that neither figure is accurate based on more recent documentation, including the WIPP inventory for the Environmental Protection Agency recertification.
Pages 3-165 and 6-15 also use apparently inconsistent TRU waste volumes. Page 3-165 shows that TRU waste generation at SRS in 2001 was 64.1 cubic yards of TRU and 380 cubic yards of Mixed TRU. Page 6-15 shows “current” SRS TRU waste generation as 88 cubic yards. As already noted in #2 above, the TRU waste volume numbers are not credible, including for SRS.
Once again, the Draft SPEIS must be substantially revised and re-issued for public comment to correct those major deficiencies because the Draft “is so inadequate as to preclude meaningful analysis.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(a).
Thank you for your full consideration and response to SRIC comments, including the scoping comments, and to all of the other tens of thousands of commentors.
Yours truly,
Don Hancock
Southwest Research and Information Center
PO Box 4524
Albuquerque, NM 87196-4524
505/262-1862
www.sric.org
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