Walter Tamosaitis, once a top engineer in the nation's nuclear
weapons cleanup program, has been relegated to a basement storage
room equipped with cardboard-box and plywood furniture with nothing
to do for the last year.
Tamosaitis' bosses sent him there
when he persisted in raising concerns about risks at the Energy
Department's project to deal with millions of gallons of radioactive
waste near Hanford, Wash., including the potential for hydrogen gas
explosions.
"Walt
is killing us," said Frank Russo, Bechtel Corp.'s top manager
at the project, in an email to Tamosaitis' boss urging that the
engineer be brought under control.
Now, an independent
government watchdog agency, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, has backed up Tamosaitis and issued a rebuke to Energy
Secretary Steven Chu, concluding that the safety culture at the
$12.3-billion project is "flawed" and that significant
risks exist in the plant's design.
The conclusion came after
a nearly yearlong investigation, which took testimony from 45
witnesses and reviewed 30,000 documents. It confirmed that
Tamosaitis had been "abruptly removed from the project"
when he raised technical questions about its design, and that the
actions against him had frightened other engineers.
"The
board finds that expression of technical dissent affecting safety …
were discouraged, if not opposed or rejected without review,"
safety board Chairman Peter Winokur wrote to Chu on June 9. "As
of the writing of this finding, Dr. Tamosaitis sits in a basement
cubicle in Richland with no meaningful work."
In a
five-page response Friday, the Energy Department said it was
"committed to continuous improvement and teamwork."
"We
believe the plant can operate safely," Deputy Energy Secretary
Daniel Poneman said in an interview. "I am not going to kid
you, it is challenging technically."
Hanford is the
nation's most contaminated piece of property, housing 56 million
gallons of highly radioactive sludge in underground tanks that pose
a long-term risk of leaking into the Columbia River.
The
Energy Department wants to embed the waste into solid glass and ship
it to a future dump, but so far not a single gallon has been
treated. The project is more than 20 years behind the original
schedule, and the cost has more than tripled.
"It's
pitiful," said Tamosaitis, who was manager of research and
technology for San Francisco-based URS
Corp., a prime subcontractor to Bechtel Corp. in building the
waste treatment plant.
Until he was removed from his job,
Tamosaitis, 63, managed a technical staff of as many as 30 in-house
scientists and engineers, and an external staff that numbered in the
hundreds. He holds a doctorate in systems engineering. He spent 20
years working for DuPont Corp., running chemical plants all over the
country, and then another 20 years in the nuclear cleanup
industry.
Tamosaitis sent an email last year to a small
circle of the top engineering experts in chemical mixing technology,
raising concerns over the decision years ago to use an untested and
potentially risky technology in the Hanford design.
The
processing of the waste at Hanford requires a large number of mixing
tanks up to 400,000 gallons in capacity where sludges, salts and
liquids are separated into high-level and low-level radioactivity
steams, using chemical processes and filters. More than two dozen
key tanks at Hanford would use "pulse jet mixers," a
system that engineers compare to turkey basters — liquid is sucked
into a tube and then squirted out.
The system was supposed to
be cheaper than mechanical agitators and less subject to failure, a
crucial feature once the tanks are in operation and too radioactive
to service. But no U.S. nuclear plant uses the technology, and
Tamosaitis said there was significant doubt whether they could
adequately keep the tanks mixed.
If tanks are not kept
properly mixed, plutonium solids could settle at the bottom and go
critical, he said. A poorly mixed tank could also result in large
burps of explosive hydrogen gas. And finally, the solids could plug
up pipes in the plant.
"They are legitimate concerns,"
Winokur said. Poneman agreed: "They are valid issues."
Under a recommendation from the safety board, the Energy Department
has agreed to conduct a large-scale demonstration of the system at a
cost of more than $100 million.
Poneman said ideally the
issue of testing the system should have been resolved long ago and
that it was a mistake to begin construction of the plant before the
design was 90% complete. At present, the construction is 55%
complete and the design is 80% complete, according to Bechtel
spokeswoman Suzanne Heaston.
URS officials declined to
comment. Heaston said it was urgent that any "hypothetical
technical questions" not delay construction, adding that
Bechtel was committed to a good safety culture. She said she could
not comment on Tamosaitis' treatment.
Tamosaitis said he was
excluded from staff meetings and few people at the company talked to
him any longer. For the moment, he is still isolated in his basement
office. "I have a telephone, but I don't use it," he said.
"It is probably tape-recorded."
He considers his
reputation in the engineering industry destroyed. The Labor
Department is investigating his treatment. He is also suing URS,
Bechtel and five executives, seeking a new position, an apology and
changes in the program.